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EVIDENCE FOR GOD FROM CERTAINTY
Katherin A. Rogers

Human beings can have “strongly certain” beliefs—indubitable, veridical
beliefs with a unique phenomenology—about necessarily true propositions
like 2+2=4. On the plausible assumption that mathematical entities are platonic
abstracta, naturalist theories fail to provide an adequate causal explanation
for such beliefs because they cannot show how the propositional content of
the causally inert abstracta can figure in a chain of physical causes. Theories
which explain such beliefs as “corresponding” to the abstracta, but without
any causal relationship, entail impossibilities. God, or a very god-like being,
provides the best causal explanation for such beliefs.

The fact that human beings can have indubitable beliefs about necessarily true propositions is evidence for the existence of God because the best
causal explanation for the existence of such beliefs involves positing a being with two properties which, in combination, render their possessor at
least god-like. This being has the sort of causal power that could produce
beliefs in human minds, and it somehow possesses (or has immediate
access to) necessarily true propositions necessarily. Aspects of the physical universe might have the former property, but nothing in the physical
universe possesses the latter. I will focus on a specific sort of certainty and
on beliefs about mathematical propositions. Some of the claims on which
I base my argument are controversial, but they are defensible and worthy
of consideration.
I will take it as a datum to be explained that human beings sometimes
have “strongly certain” beliefs. I am using “belief” in a rough and general
way such that it is legitimate to refer to an instance of knowledge or a
rational intuition as a “belief.” A more fine-grained analysis might distinguish between “belief” and knowledge or the sort of “seeming” that
constitutes rational intuition, but the catch-all term serves my purposes
here. A strongly certain belief is characterized by several features. First it
is veridical. It is held with a certainty such that having the belief entails
the truth of the proposition believed. A variety of diﬀerent epistemologies
might allow room for such a certainty, and I do not need to fill out my conception in accord with one rather than another. My argument can proceed
so long as it is granted that there are some beliefs which are held in such a
way that what is believed cannot be false.
In addition to being veridical, introspection suggests that, as occurrent,
strongly certain beliefs possess a set of properties which bestow upon
them a recognizably unique phenomenology. I do not propose a complete
description of the experience of having a strongly certain belief, and it is
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plausible to think that there may be real characteristics which are too subtle
to distinguish consciously, but which contribute to the felt sui generis nature of the strongly certain belief. There are, however, two key properties
which can be isolated and described. First, strongly certain belief will be
“luminous.” That is, if I am strongly certain that x, then I know that I know
that x. And secondly—though I think this quality is intimately related to
the first, and perhaps really just another aspect of a single phenomenon—
strongly certain belief will be “immediate.” It will be characterized by a
direct recognition perhaps best described phenomenologically through
the standard metaphors of intuition, a “seeing” or “grasping” of the object
or content of the belief. This sense of immediacy is only strengthened by
careful consideration. With perception one might prima facie have some
sense of immediately “seeing” one’s monitor screen, but upon being told
about one’s eyes, photons, etc. one will grant that there is at the very least
a many-linked causal story to tell connecting one’s seeing and one’s monitor. Strong certainty is not like that. There are no intermediaries between
the intellectual “seeing” and the content seen, and careful consideration
of the experience of “seeing” the content of one’s belief only confirms the
experience of immediacy.
The claim that some beliefs are held with strong certainty does not
entail that every human thinker has strongly certain beliefs. Perhaps
some people have none. Nor does it entail that if one person believes
a proposition with strong certainty, then anyone who understands that
proposition must also hold it with strong certainty. It should be noted
that there are many reasonable analyses of what it means to be “certain”
of some belief which fall short of strong certainty. On these analyses it
is consistent that “I am certain that x” and yet it is not the case that x. In
that situation the phenomenology of my belief would diﬀer from that of
a strongly certain belief—I would not know that I know x, and I would
not “grasp” x immediately. Call instances of less-than-strong certainty,
“weak” certainty.
A paradigm instance of a strongly certain belief is, “I exist.” If I am
strongly certain right now that I exist, then it is true that I exist. And I know
that I know I exist. Timothy Williamson mounts an attack on the claim to
luminosity in many of the standard examples, but even Williamson has
to grant the possibility of a few luminous beliefs including “that one exists.”1 Moreover I “grasp” my own existence, I “see” myself with a sort of
pure immediacy. Here it seems to me that my cognitive access to myself fits
the sort of experience which William Alston calls intuitive knowledge. He
quotes H. H. Price to the eﬀect that “such knowledge ‘is simply the situation in which some entity or some fact is directly present to consciousness.’”
Alston goes on to explain, “I cannot be in the state of knowledge that p so
construed, without its being the case that p; for that state just consists of the
presence of that fact to my consciousness; without that fact there could be
no such state. Knowledge is not a state that could be just what it is intrinsically without the actual existence of the object; it has no intrinsic character
over and above the presence of that object to consciousness.”2
It seems to me that, in addition to being strongly certain that I exist, I
have strongly certain beliefs about some necessary truths, like the basic
laws of logic and some of the simpler mathematical propositions.3 In

EVIDENCE FOR GOD FROM CERTAINTY

33

this paper I will focus on strongly certain mathematical belief. The problem of the causes of knowledge of mathematical truth has already been
discussed by philosophers of mathematics, and looking at how they
frame the question will be useful. The content of strongly certain belief
in simple mathematical propositions is interestingly diﬀerent from the
case of “I exist.” In addition to my “grasp” of the bare proposition, like
“2+2=4,” there is recognition of the necessity of the proposition. It seems
to me that this recognition of the necessity is included in the grasping of
“2+2=4.” A child might understand that “2+2=4” without understanding
what it means for some proposition to be necessarily true, but if the child
does not see that “2+2=4” in such a way that he automatically applies it in
any instance, he does not really grasp it. If he really gets “2+2=4,” a bit of
Socratic questioning would soon elicit the fact that he sees that “2+2=4”
must be true always and everywhere. So if I have a strongly certain belief
that “2+2=4,” and recognition that this is a necessary truth is included in
that belief, then 2+2 does equal 4 necessarily, I know that I know this, and
I have an immediate grasp of it.
It should be admitted first, though, that there are philosophers who deny
the possibility of strong certainty. There are those—Quine springs to mind—
who insist that even the claims of mathematics do not constitute necessary
truth. “The proverbial necessity of mathematical truth resides merely in our
exempting the mathematical sentences when choosing which one of a refuted block of sentences to revoke. We exempt them because changing them
would reverberate excessively through science.”4 This sort of fallibilism is a
diﬃcult thesis to defend, however. Either the fallibilist oﬀers an argument
for his position or he does not. If he does not, then we have no reason to accept his counterintuitive conclusion that even apparently necessary truths
like 2+2=4 might be false. But if he does give an argument, then it will have
premises, and the premises will inevitably be more dubious than the claim
that 2+2=4 is a necessary truth. Quine’s story about belief acquisition begins,
“Our intake of information about the world consists only of the triggering
of our nerve endings by light rays and molecules from our environment,”
and goes on to make a series of claims about conditioning, animal expectations, the molding influence of evolution, language acquisition, etc.5 This
story about belief acquisition concludes to, among other things, the point
about the in-principle-revokable nature of our mathematical commitments.
But any of these claims is far, far more dubious than “ ‘2+2=4’ cannot possibly be false.” One can read Quine’s epistemic story as a version of a fallibilist
argument. If this causal story of how we come to any and all of our beliefs is
correct, then it follows that any belief, including 2+2=4, is revokable. If this
argument is valid—in a sense that is the claim of the present paper—then
it seems a reductio showing that this causal story of how we come to our
beliefs must be mistaken. Any argument for this skepticism about necessary
truth must face the same sort of criticism, mutatis mutandis.
A more moderate fallibilist might say that there are necessary truths,
but we have no infallible way to recognize them. We cannot know that
we know, and we do not have the sort of “grasping of the content” that
strong certainty entails. To such a one I can only respond that I find myself incapable of entertaining the belief that I might be wrong about 2+2
equaling 4. Perhaps the fault lies with my imagination or perhaps the
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more moderate fallibilist simply holds the belief that 2+2=4 in a somewhat
diﬀerent way than I do.
It seems to me that I have a strongly certain belief that 2+2=4, and I can
only ask the reader to introspect regarding his own beliefs. The question
I want to address is, how did I come to have such a belief? My belief itself
is a contingent phenomenon, and therefore it has a cause. I will argue that
such an eﬀect is most plausibly ascribed to God (or a god-like being). It is
important here to distinguish between the causal question which I am asking, and the diﬀerent, epistemic, question of how I can trust my belief that
2+2=4. I am not engaged in the sort of project which occupied Descartes in
the First Meditation. Descartes holds that one could be brought to doubt
even the simple rules of arithmetic if presented with the hypothesis of the
evil genius. And then it is only by eliminating that hypothesis through the
introduction of God that we can defeat skepticism.
The claim that the evil genius might deceive even with regard to what
is most clearly and distinctly perceived generates the famous criticism of
Descartes known as the Cartesian circle: How can we possibly mount an
argument for knowledge of God, or anything else, if we have cast our
most fundamental beliefs and our basic noetic abilities into doubt? Unlike
Descartes I am not invoking God to solve some problem of ubiquitous
doubt. In positing strongly certain belief in the basic laws of logic and
simple mathematical propositions I deny Descartes’ skeptical claim about
these necessary truths. Mark Heller suggests this move as a solution to the
Cartesian circle and argues that it follows that it is not necessary to introduce God to improve our epistemic status with regard to what is clearly
and distinctly perceived.6 That seems to me to be correct. If I have strongly
certain belief that 2+2=4, my epistemic status regarding that belief really
couldn’t get any better. I need no further justification. My simply having it
is suﬃcient to my epistemic needs. Though my discussion has epistemic
ramifications, I am not asking about justification or reliability. Rather I am
asking a question about adequate explanation: How did I come to have
this (inherently justified, completely reliable) strongly certain belief?
My argument, then, is not of the same sort as Plantinga’s in Chapter 12
of Warrant and Proper Function, where the naturalist hypothesis is seen as a
defeater for the reliability of belief. My argument is closer to Augustine’s in
Book 2 of On Free Will: The evident fact of our knowledge of mathematical
truth, which knowledge could not have its source in the contingent physical universe, shows that there is an eternal, immutable, and transcendent
realm of such truth which must be identified with God.
The distinction between the question of epistemic reliability, which
I am not addressing, and the question of adequate causal explanations
is so important that perhaps a simple analogy will help to reinforce it.
Suppose it is a metaphysical necessity that Snickers Bars have peanuts.
Suppose I (occurrently) know that this is the case. Then if I know I have
a Snickers Bar in my hand, I know I have a candy bar with peanuts in my
hand. Here the peanuts correspond to the veridical nature of the strongly
certain belief. If I have a strongly certain belief I cannot even entertain the
possibility of its being false. Period.
If I take my Snickers Bar as “given” then I need not look for some additional explanation for the presence of the peanuts. But Snickers Bars
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are contingent. I might demand a causal explanation for the Snickers Bar
itself, and the fact of the peanuts might play an important role in shaping
my causal theory. Suppose I hypothesize that the candy bar factory down
the street provides an adequate causal explanation for the existence of the
Snickers Bar. But suppose I discover that, while the factory does produce
various sorts of candy bars, nothing in the factory is capable of inputting
peanuts. I will not decide that this Snickers Bar does not have peanuts,
since I see that it does and I believe that it must. I am committed to the
metaphysical necessity of peanuts in Snickers Bars. But since I know this
Snickers Bar has peanuts, and I know that the factory down the street
cannot produce candy bars with peanuts, I know that it is not the cause of
the Snickers Bar. I must look elsewhere for an explanation—I must find a
factory which has the capacity to add peanuts to candy bars.
I do not question the reliability of my strongly certain beliefs, but they
are contingent phenomena, and so I aim to find a causal explanation for
their existence. But an adequate causal explanation will involve causal
factors which are capable of producing beliefs that have the inherently
veridical nature and the unique phenomenology of strong certainty. I will
argue that naturalistic causal theories fail to explain all that needs explaining. By “naturalism” I mean the view that the only things with causal
power are things which are part of the spatio-temporal universe. By this
definition a “naturalist” might believe in non-causal platonic abstracta.
I will focus on mathematical beliefs since contemporary discussion of
mathematical platonism has already brought some relevant diﬃculties
with naturalism to light. 7
For the time being I will assume that mathematical entities are platonic
abstracta and that mathematical truths like “2+2=4” are about abstract objects, though at the end of the paper, when the topic is the relationship of
God to mathematical truth, some qualifications will be proposed. In any
case mathematical truths are about some sort of “things” which are not
spatio-temporal and are not aspects of the physical universe. Certainly
this is controversial.8 But the alternative to platonism is to suggest that
numbers, for example, are aspects of the physical universe. And then it
should follow that they might come into or go out of being with the birth
and death of the universe as we know it, or that it would not have been the
case that 2+2=4 if some radically diﬀerent physical universe, or none at all,
had existed. My strong certainty that 2+2=4 entails that it is not possible
that 2+2=4 fail to obtain, and so any attempt to see this mathematical truth
as an aspect of the changing and inherently contingent physical universe
must be rejected.
If mathematical entities are platonic abstracta then presumably they are
causally inert. How then to oﬀer a causal explanation for strongly certain
beliefs, given that the human knower is located in time and space?9 The
diﬃculty lies in the fact that an adequate theory of the causes of knowledge must presumably allow for the content of the knowledge, the thing
known, to play some role in the causal explanation. This is a common
claim. A theory of the causes of perceptual knowledge which held that the
objects of perception are entirely outside of the causal chain producing the
knowledge would seem a very odd theory. Could it even be considered
an explanation of my seeing a tree, if no tree at all were involved in the
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explanation? The point can be put even a bit more strongly if one assumes
something like a Kripkean analysis of meaning and reference in which a
“chain of communication” reaching back to the thing being referred to is
a necessary part of establishing the very meaning of a term such that belief
would be impossible without the causal connection.10 Later in this paper
I will have occasion to revisit this assumption that an adequate causal
theory of knowledge must involve some connection between the knower
and the known, even when the known is necessary truth, but let it stand
for now.
Could we argue that the theory of evolution oﬀers a causal explanation
which can successfully relate the knower to the known in such a way as to
explain strongly certain belief? The standard (radically simplified) evolutionary story about the causes of beliefs which have epistemic reliability
goes something like this: (1) Eons of evolution have produced human
beings with belief-producing mechanisms. (2) These belief-producing
mechanisms produce beliefs that are likely to be “useful” (i.e., will help
the believer survive and reproduce). (3) Beliefs that are useful are likely
to be true. So evolution produces reliably true beliefs.
Even some staunch defenders of natural proofs for the existence of God
hold that evolution is adequate to explain how our true beliefs come to be.
In Is There a God? Richard Swinburne argues that Darwinism is adequate
to explain the connection between the believer and the world. How would
this come about?
The answer is evident: animals with beliefs are more likely to survive
if their beliefs are largely true. False beliefs—for example, about the
location of food or predators—will lead to rapid elimination in the
struggle for food or predators [sic]. If you believe that there is no
table present, when there is one, you will fall over it, and so on. Those
in whom the brain states which give rise to beliefs are connected by
causal chains to the outside world, in such a way that the causal chain
is normally only activated by a state of aﬀairs which causes the brain
state which in turn causes the belief that the state of aﬀairs holds, will
normally hold true beliefs about the world and in consequence be
more likely to survive.11
Recently philosophers from very diﬀerent camps have raised serious
doubts that evolution could really be expected to produce epistemically
reliable cognitive faculties.12 But for the purposes of my argument I can
grant that evolution is the source of mechanisms which produce beliefs
which are likely to be useful and hence are likely to be true, especially
when the issue is food or predators. But what about strongly certain belief
that 2+2=4? A very pressing problem is this: Given that this content is causally inert, what could possibly “activate” the causal chain which causes the
brain state which causes the belief? I will return to this below in discussing
Nagel. First I will focus on a somewhat diﬀerent issue regarding the special status of strongly certain beliefs—their inherently veridical nature and
unique phenomenology which includes luminosity and immediacy.
In the evolutionary story nature produced beliefs which are “likely to
be useful and hence true.” But that likely entails “possibly not useful and,
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even if useful, possibly not true.” For any given belief produced through
this mechanism it is possible that it is not really a useful belief. Roger
Penrose suggests that mathematical beliefs may have arisen as an accidental, and potentially harmful, side-eﬀect of the useful ability to understand
about food and predators. He oﬀers a splendid cartoon in which a brainy
pre-historic fellow is having a moment of illumination with respect to
Mammoth hunting, while his (even brainier) compadre studies geometry
in the dirt, unaware that he is about to be pounced on by a saber-toothed
tiger.13 One could even argue that, unlikely as it seems, whole categories of
beliefs, perhaps all beliefs, are mere epiphenomena which play no genuine causal role in the survival and reproduction of the believer.
The connection between “produced by eons of evolution” and “useful”
seems likely, but is not necessary. It is possible that any given belief, or
even the whole belief-producing mechanism, may fail to be useful. The
connection between “useful” and “true” in the evolutionary story is not
necessary either. One could tell many a plausible tale in which holding
systematically false beliefs, perhaps about one’s own talents and importance, proves more useful for the metaphorical “purposes” of evolution
than believing the truth would have done. It seems reasonable to suppose
that in general the beliefs that seem useful, are useful, and that the reason
they are useful is that they are true. But the evolutionary causal story, if it
is indeed the story of how we come by all of our beliefs, seems to entail the
possibility that none of our beliefs are useful, and the possibility that none
of them are true. But given that I am strongly certain that 2+2=4 I know
it is not possible that all my beliefs are false. The causal story which appeals to purely naturalistic evolutionary processes proposes that all of our
beliefs—the true and the false beliefs about contingent phenomena, and
the true and the false beliefs about necessary truths (I might easily have a
false belief about a complex arithmetical proposition)—are the eﬀects of
the same evolutionary processes. But this causal explanation fails for our
strongly certain beliefs because there is nothing in the story to account for
the inherently veridical nature of these beliefs.
Moreover there is no explanation for the unique phenomenology of
the strongly certain beliefs. If all of our beliefs are the eﬀects of the same
causes, whence the luminosity and the immediacy of the strongly certain
beliefs given that these properties do not, could not, characterize other, less
certain beliefs? A causal story which connects the knower to the known
through the usefulness of belief seems ill-suited to explaining the fact that
I “know that I know,” when it seems obvious that luminosity would not
contribute to a belief’s enabling the believer to reproduce. Further, the
evolutionary story ought to undermine the sense of immediacy which is
part of the experience of strong certainty. It proposes that I believe that
2+2=4 because eons of evolution favored the survival of those who held
that sort of belief. This suggests a long, involved causal chain, where none
of the links consists in any immediate “grasping” 2+2=4. But this story
strikes me as doubtful, whereas I do “see” that 2+2=4. Unlike with perceptual knowledge, this causal theory does not incline me to reassess the
immediacy of my “seeing” that 2+2=4. Instead I conclude that something
is lacking from the causal story. And, finally, remember that the strongly
certain belief concerning “2+2=4” recognizes the necessity of the claim.
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The evolutionary account oﬀers no explanation for our modal knowledge, since it seems clear that recognizing the contingency or necessity of
certain propositions does not play a role in our success as reproducers.14
Thomas Nagel agrees that the processes of evolution are not suﬃcient
to explain true belief, but goes on to dismiss the “religious proposal” in
favor of,
some systematic aspect of the natural order that would make the
appearance of minds in harmony with the universe something to be
expected. . . . [There] are specific conditions of the primordial state of
our universe that, given its general laws, will lead to the formation
of molecules, galaxies, organisms, consciousness, and intelligence.
My hypothesis is only that the laws are such as to make not only the
first but also the last of these developments intelligible, given the
initial conditions that lead to the development of some organisms
or other.15
But what, in the physical universe, might “activate” a causal chain resulting in strongly certain belief? Nagel grants that the story which hopes to
explain the reliability of belief through their evolutionary “use” is not likely
to succeed. Still, there must be some causal explanation of belief, and presumably it must point to some connection between the belief and its content. Whatever one might hope for from a “systematic aspect of the natural
order” which explains “minds in harmony with the universe,” it seems
overly optimistic to expect to discover a connection between the minds
and platonic abstracta which would allow strong certitude concerning the
necessary truth of 2+2=4. The natural order, a contingent phenomenon,
simply is not in a position to bridge the gap between itself and the world
of necessary abstracta. The evolutionary causal story for strong certainty
fails because the attempt to trace the cause of true beliefs through the evolutionary development of useful beliefs cannot explain the special nature
of the strongly certain belief. But any naturalist story must suﬀer an even
more fundamental failure. If there are platonic abstracta and necessary
truths, then they are not aspects of the contingent, physical universe, and
therefore if the causal processes which produce the molecules, the galaxies
etc. are purely physical, they cannot supply a connection between the contingent knower and the abstract, necessary, known. A platonic abstractum
cannot “activate” a spatio-temporal causal chain. That being the case, there
will be no naturalist causal explanation for the veridical nature, the luminosity, and the immediacy of the strongly certain belief in a necessary truth
like 2+2=4. (George Bealer’s analysis of rational intuition may reinforce this
point when he argues that intuition, “intellectual seeing,” and perceptual
seeing, by and large, cannot overlap. He writes, “most things that can seem
intellectually to be so cannot seem sensorily to be so, and conversely.”)16
But perhaps the naturalist can deny my assumption that the causal
explanation of the strongly certain belief must show some sort of causal
connection between the knower and the known, between the belief and
its content. Seeing that there can be no “natural” causal connection between the knower and the abstracta known, the naturalist might argue
that there can be strongly certain beliefs, like the belief that 2+2=4, which
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are amenable to a causal explanation in which the abstract content simply
does not play a role. Perhaps our strongly certain beliefs are just “thrown
up” somehow, with no connection to the abstracta, and yet nonetheless,
what “grounds” our strong certitude is the fact that the proposition about
the platonic abstracta is true. Let us say that our beliefs are caused only
by natural processes. Once you have explained the natural processes you
have given a complete explanation for the existence of the belief. Some of
our beliefs are held with strong certainty and are about platonic abstracta.
We have strong certainty because the proposition is true, but there is absolutely no causal connection of any sort between the belief and the true
proposition. There is simply a correspondence. And that is enough.17
First it is important to remember that I am not asking what it is that
“makes” strongly certain beliefs reliable. Suppose the naturalist claims
that “Any causal explanation which is suﬃcient to explain the existence
of our strongly certain beliefs is suﬃcient to explain their veridical nature
(absolute reliability), luminosity, and immediacy.” I agree. Any causal explanation which is suﬃcient to explain the existence of a Snickers Bar is
suﬃcient to explain its having peanuts. In cases like “2+2=4” it is right to
say that, “whatever explains the undeniable fact that we have intuitions
with specific contents, suﬃces as an explanation of the actual reliability of
our intuitions as it surely excludes contradictory content.”18
My question, however, is not what explains the reliability of the strongly certain belief, but what explains the strongly certain belief. Not just
any explanation will do. Suppose Anne expresses her puzzlement over
the source of her strongly certain belief that 2+2=4 to her mother. And
suppose her mother answers that the complete causal explanation for
Anne’s belief is that when sentences are inscribed on crystal tablets and
then the tablets are ground up and fed to small children, the children will
come to believe what was written on the tablets with strong certainty.
Anne ingested the ground crystal bearing the sentence “2+2=4” with her
strained peas, and that is why she believes 2+2=4 with strong certainty.
Hearing this odd theory about its cause will not shake Anne’s commitment to that belief that 2+2=4. Whatever caused the belief, the belief is true,
luminous, and immediate. But is the strained pea theory adequate as a
causal explanation for the belief?
The strained pea theory suggests several serious questions. Ordinarily
in our thinking about belief acquisition the digestive system plays little if
any role because it presumably is not the part of the person which receives
the sort of data which can be processed as information. Anne’s mother
might respond that Anne has made a mistake in assuming that the causes
of strongly certain belief must involve the reception of data like the causes
of other sorts of beliefs. Anne might note that the actual scratchings on the
crystal, in the form of the Arabic numerals we use, are merely symbols
without inherent meaning and could not possibly convey any concept to
an infant. Anne’s mother might respond that Anne is still making the mistake of assuming that the content of the belief must figure somehow in the
cause of the belief. Anne’s mother admits that the scratchings on the crystal do not somehow “contain” the actual content, 2+2=4, but her contention
is this: the fact that 2+2=4 has no causal role to play in the production of
Anne’s belief.
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Anne might respond that divorcing the content of 2+2=4 from the causes
which produce the strongly certain belief that 2+2=4 leads to impossible consequences. On the strained pea theory, “2+2=5” could have been inscribed
on the crystal, and then, according to the theory; she, Anne, would have
the strongly certain belief that 2+2=5. But that is impossible. Anne’s mother
might argue that the latter point is irrelevant, since in fact it was “2+2=4”
that Anne ingested with her peas. But Anne’s criticism is not refuted. The
theory entails that “2+2=5” really could have been scratched on the crystal,
and then that Anne would have had a strongly certain belief that 2+2=5.
But a strongly certain belief that 2+2=5 is an impossibility. A theory which
entails an impossibility is not a good theory.
The naturalist’s proposed “correspondence” theory is subject to roughly
the same problems as the strained pea theory. The correspondence theory
proposes that the belief that 2+2=4 is correct because it corresponds to the
truth, and it is inherently reliable, but the fact that 2+2=4 plays no role in the
causal history of the strongly certain belief that 2+2=4. The belief itself can
be completely causally explained by naturalistic factors. As in the strained
pea theory, there is no causal connection between the knower and the
known, but, according to the correspondence theory, that doesn’t matter.
The first claim, echoing Anne to her mother, is that it is standard to
suppose that knowledge requires some sort of causal connection between the knower and the known. This is certainly true of perceptual
knowledge. Suppose we were to tell a correspondence story of the causes
of perception. There is no causal connection at all between the object
“seen” and the experience of seeing it. Rather, natural processes happen to have produced the experiences of seeing certain objects, and they
happen to have produced the actual existence of those objects, and there
just happens to be a consistent correspondence between the presence of
the object and the experience. (It is not that natural processes “happen
to have produced a correspondence” as some sort of causal connection
between the perceiver and the perceived. The correspondence itself must
be a brute fact.)
This seems a very strange story to tell about perceptual knowledge. On
this theory the experience that we would ordinarily describe as “seeing a
tree” seems better put as “having a tree-seeing experience,” since there is
absolutely no connection between you, the perceiver, and the tree. And
if this is the story you tell about perceptual knowledge, then you invite
skepticism. The scenario entails the possibility that natural processes have
thrown up perceptions without the corresponding objects. Your theory
says that the objects are there, but it also claims that your knowledge and
absolutely all the phenomena of your experience are explained without
any appeal to the reality of the objects.
A theory of the causes of perceptual knowledge which denies any causal
role to the objects of perception seems a non-starter. Could it be that strongly
certain belief is so diﬀerent from perceptual knowledge that, while theories
about the latter need to establish a connection between the knower and the
known, theories about the former do not. The paradigm case of the strongly
certain belief is “I exist.” Here there seems to be a clear and direct cause of
the belief—the knower’s immediate presence to himself. But perhaps the
story is diﬀerent when the content of the belief is necessary truth. It seems
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to me that the burden of proof here is on the one who would deny the
standard requirement that knowledge depend in some way upon the facts
known. But perhaps the correspondence theory has an argument to show
that knowledge of necessary truth must be treated diﬀerently from other
sorts of knowledge.
One might argue that the fact that 2+2=4 could not possibly figure
in any causal explanation. Joel Pust, developing an argument by David
Lewis, writes,
we can make little sense of the truth-makers of necessary propositions
being causally implicated in the explanation of any fact, including the
fact that we have reliable intuitions regarding necessity. . . . This is
because the counterfactuals upon which such an explanation would
presumably rest, counterfactuals such as “If 2+2 were not equal to 4,
then I would not find 2+2=4 intuitive,” are deviant and, on standard
semantics, uniformly and vacuously true. . . . Hence, a natural strategy
often employed in the realm of contingent truth to show that our opinions depend upon the truth—that of showing that if the facts were
diﬀerent, so too would be our opinions—simply has no application to
the necessary.19
Does this argument show that our knowledge of necessary truth must be
causally independent of that truth? An alternative conclusion would be
that there are diﬃculties with the analysis of causation which reduces it
to nothing but counterfactual dependence, and these problems become
glaring when the question is how we know necessary truth. A general discussion of the nature of causation would take us too far afield. Here I will
simply suggest that what Pust’s argument actually proves is that some
claims figuring in causal explanations resist counterfactual analysis.
In saying that necessary truth can play a constitutive role in a causal
explanation, I do not mean to say that necessary truth per se or platonic
abstracta can act as causal agents. But the claim that they can play no
role at all is false. Suppose I ask my son how it is that I owe him $11. He
responds that on Friday I borrowed $8 and then last Tuesday I borrowed
$3, and 8+3=11. He has given me a causal explanation involving not only
the historical facts of our financial transactions, but an additional piece
of mathematical information without which the explanation would be
incomplete. I might jokingly respond, “So if it’s not the case that 8+3=11,
then I don’t owe you $11!” Of course, if it is not the case that 8+3=11 anything and everything follows. But that does not mean that my son’s explanation is either non-causal or incoherent. And it doesn’t show that
“8+3=11” was not part of the explanation.
And there are deep problems with saying that the content of the necessary truth does not play a role in the causal explanation of our strongly
certain beliefs—that there need be no causal connection between the
knower and the known. The correspondence theorist grants that “2+2=4”
is not a phenomenon of the spatio-temporal universe. He goes on to hold
that my strongly certain belief that 2+2=4 is wholly the product of natural
processes, perhaps beginning with Quine’s “triggering of our nerve endings by light rays and molecules from our environment.” Nerve endings
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get triggered, a long chain of events occurs in the spatio-temporal universe, and I come to have the strongly certain belief that 2+2=4. I have no
doubt that my belief is veridical and utterly reliable, but is this “triggered
nerve” theory plausible? (Let the “triggered nerve” stand for the natural
processes invoked to explain belief.)
It seems in principle to be in the same family with the strained pea
theory. It gives a causal explanation for how the belief comes to be, and
it holds that the content of the belief, 2+2=4, plays no role at all in the
causal history. That being the case, the theory ought to hold that, had
the natural processes followed a slightly diﬀerent path, as of course they
could have done being contingent, a belief with all of the properties of
a strongly certain belief but with a diﬀerent content, say “2+2=5,” could
have resulted. This is impossible.
It will not do to say that there is no problem because the natural processes in fact threw up a belief that “2+2=4.”20 Analogous to the strained
pea theory, the correspondence theory entails that the light rays really could
have triggered the nerves in a “2+2=5” kind of way. There would then have
been no correspondence to the truth, but the claim of the theory is that
every aspect of the belief is explicable through the natural causes which
simply have no connection to the content of the platonic abstracta. The
theory entails that the strongly certain belief, with its content and phenomenology, would exist as the contingent phenomenon caused by the natural
processes even if its content were “2+2=5.” And that is impossible. The
triggered nerve theory, like the strained pea theory, entails an impossible
consequence, and thus is not a good theory to explain the existence of the
strongly certain belief.
Naturalism seems unable to provide a causal connection between belief
and platonic abstracta, and denying the need for some connection, as does
the correspondence theory, leads to impossible consequences. But does the
God hypothesis do any better? The claim is that God (or a god-like being)
provides what naturalism is lacking. He is a powerful causal agent who can
produce human beliefs, and He knows necessary truths necessarily so there
is no issue of explaining how He came to possess them. No contingent being—even a powerful angelic spirit, or a lesser god like Zeus—supplies what
is required here, since for any contingent being, its beliefs must be contingent
phenomena and hence in need of further causal explanation. It is true that a
necessarily existent knower with great power might fall short of the God of
classical theism. Still, the argument points to a being who is at least very godlike. With the possible exception of Anselm’s Proslogion argument, this is the
case for all of the attempted proofs and adduced evidence for God.
There are diﬀerent possible analyses of the relationship of God to necessary truth. The fact that He knows necessary truths necessarily means that
there is no question of how He came to know them, and that may be enough
for my purposes here. A full discussion lies beyond the scope of this paper,
but a brief mention of some of the possibilities should assure the reader that
the job of providing a coherent analysis can be done.21 I should note that
Descartes’ suggestion that God somehow “creates” necessary truth is not
among the viable options, in my opinion. It is subject to the insurmountable
problem that it places God “above” the laws of logic. But if the laws of logic
do not apply to God then nothing coherent can be said about Him.22
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Many contemporary philosophers of religion go to the opposite extreme
and embrace what is in essence the other horn of the logician’s version of
the Euthyphro problem. If God does not create the laws of logic and mathematics, then, it is assumed, such laws must exist independently of God.
This view might be adequate for my argument here. On the thesis that the
necessary truths exist independently of God, perhaps the claim that God
is necessarily omniscient is enough to explain His knowledge of necessary
truth, and so it may be suﬃcient for my present purposes.
From the perspective of (very) traditional theism, though, this position
demeans God. It reduces Him to the role of a sort of platonic demiurge,
a being whose knowledge and power must depend upon and conform
to a “World of the Forms” outside itself. This is not the God of the classical theism of philosophers like Augustine and Anselm and Aquinas. The
classical theist God is the absolute source of all. All that exists is God or
what He makes. On this view, God’s knowledge of necessary truth does
not depend on anything outside Himself. Rather, He is Perfect Being,
and necessary truth—the laws of logic and mathematics—are the way
all being has to be. They reflect the nature of God. Classical theism holds
that God is simple—His nature is identified with His omnipotence, His
omniscience, and His perfect goodness. On this view, not only can there
be no demand for how God “comes to know” necessary truths, but there
is no explanation at all for God’s knowledge of necessary truths beyond
the simple fact of His necessary existence.23
This “anti-platonic” analysis of the relationship of God to necessary
truth has the further advantage that it does not hypothesize a world of
ontologically dubious platonic abstracta just “there” in the universe. Absent God, the platonist understanding of numbers seems preferable to the
alternative, the claim that numbers are an aspect of the physical universe.
But nevertheless, the universe of the naturalist who allows this platonic
realm seems a strange, unparsimonious, and indeed schizophrenic place.
All of the causal action is set among the objects of perceptual experience,
but in addition to spatio-temporal things there are these other . . . what?
Besides the problem of how the abstracta could play a role in the beliefs
of corporeal creatures such as ourselves, there is an intrinsic puzzle about
their ontological status. The theist who sees necessary truth as existing
independently of God seems to face this question as well. What sort of
“things” are these platonic abstracta? As Robert Adams notes, they seem
like ideas.24 Classical theism solves the problem by placing necessary truth
in the mind of God and identifying it with the nature of God. This seems
to me by far the best move.
There may be various ways to tell the story of how God causes our
strongly certain beliefs. Perhaps, as Augustine thought, He implants them
directly in our minds. This may accord best with the phenomenological
quality of immediacy that I have taken to be characteristic of strongly certain belief. Perhaps other stories might do the job as well. The most important claim is that God is involved as an agent who establishes the required
causal connection between the believer and the propositions believed.
But if God is omnipotent couldn’t he produce a strongly certain belief in
a false proposition, “2+2=5” for example? That is, doesn’t the theist hypothesis face the same problem as the correspondence theory and the strained
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pea theory? No. First note that God is good and would not Himself deliberately deceive. But more fundamentally, a strongly certain belief with
the content “2+2=5” is an impossibility. A belief in “2+2=5” is not veridical
or luminous, and does not have the sort of immediacy which consists in a
“grasping” of a fact. The problem with the strained pea theory and the correspondence theory as causal explanations of strongly certain belief is that
both divorce the content of the belief from the causal processes that produced it and so could not avoid the impossible entailment that a strongly
certain belief could have a falsehood as its content. The theist theory, on
the other hand, insists that only a cause which could “implant” the content
of necessary truth in our minds could possibly be the source of strongly
certain belief. God is omnipotent, but omnipotence does not include the
ability to do the impossible. God is in a position to cause strongly certain
belief, but this does not entail the impossible consequence that God could
cause a strongly certain belief in a false proposition.
But doesn’t invoking God as the cause of our strongly certain beliefs
generate a problem of what might be termed epistemic theodicy? That is,
the vast majority of our beliefs are held with less than strong certainty. We
are, in fact, woefully ignorant. Surely if there were a good God who loves
us and produces our strongly certain beliefs, He would want us to know
as much of the truth with as much certainty as possible. Undoubtedly
many beliefs are not of the sort that could be held with strong certainty,
but couldn’t we have more strongly certain knowledge than we do? Isn’t
our ignorance evidence that there is no belief-producing God? No. The
premises of the argument from epistemic evil are weak. For all we know,
our ignorance may be a necessary part of the divine plan. Perhaps the
struggle to overcome it is valuable for the development of human virtues.
And perhaps our ignorance ultimately stems from human free choices so
God cannot eradicate it without doing damage to the freedom which is a
terribly important human property. This question in epistemic theodicy
is amenable to the same sorts of responses that any version of the theist
problem of evil raises.
Only a god-like being can provide a suﬃcient explanation for our
strongly certain beliefs concerning platonic abstracta (and necessary truth
in general), and so the existence of such beliefs provides some evidence for
the existence of God. There are responses open to the committed atheist.
He can simply deny that there are strongly certain beliefs regarding mathematical propositions and hold that no belief involving platonic abstracta
can be held with the proposed unique phenomenology such that the belief
entails the truth of the proposition believed, is luminous and immediate.
Possibly it is not the case that 2+2=4. And then he can provide a causal
history of his belief that 2+2=4 through any of the naturalist theories proposed above. These theories fail as explanations of strongly certain belief,
but they might succeed as explanations for beliefs of a diﬀerent sort.
An alternative move would be to grant the strongly certain beliefs about
mathematical entities, allow the necessity of some connection between the
believer and the abstracta, but radically revise one’s platonism. One might
propose that the platonic entities themselves do have some sort of causal
powers.25 But it is diﬃcult to see how “3” might be an agent or interact
causally with the citizens of the spatio-temporal universe. And a theory
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depending on a possibly infinite number of agent abstracta at work in
the world seems to depart from the empiricist and parsimonious motivations behind naturalism at least as much as, and perhaps more than, the
religious thesis.
Another alternative for the atheist is to stick with standard platonism,
embrace strongly certain beliefs regarding platonic abstracta, and admit
that they defy explanation. A more optimistic move would be to grant
that there is not a satisfactory causal story yet. Although now the inherent
diﬃculties of explaining how the contingent phenomena of our physical
universe could produce strongly certain beliefs about mathematical propositions seem insurmountable, we may trust that the Science of the Future
will find a way. These responses are problematic, but one or another seems
unavoidable for the atheist. Someone who is not powerfully committed to
the non-existence of God, though, granting that we sometimes do have
strongly certain beliefs about necessary propositions, ought to conclude
that this provides some evidence for God.26
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NOTES
1. Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 107.
2. William Alston, “Does God have beliefs?” in Divine Nature and Human
Language (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 178–93, see p. 187.
Reprinted from Religious Studies 22 (1987): 287–306. Alston goes on to say that
this sort of knowledge may be reserved to God.
3. Williamson (2000) allows luminosity to these as well, pp. 107–08.
4. From Quine’s “Philosophical self-portrait” in the Penguin Dictionary of
Philosophy ed. Thomas Mautner (1997), p. 466.
5. Ibid.
6. Mark Heller, “Painted Mules and the Cartesian Circle,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (1996): 29–56.
7. It does not seem to me that the problem of mathematical knowledge can
be solved by reducing it to logical knowledge. The problem only gets pushed
back a step. Bob Hale (“Is Platonism Epistemologically Bankrupt?” in Hale
and Wright, The Reason’s Proper Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), pp.
169–88) notes the analogous nature of knowledge about mathematical statements and knowledge about logical statements.
8. There are a variety of theories suggesting that the necessity of mathematical statements can be preserved while locating mathematical “objects”
within the confines of the physical universe. See for example, D. M Armstrong,
A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989), chap. 10; P. Maddy, Naturalism in Mathematics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
9. The apparent impossibility of describing the causal interaction between the World of the Forms and the physical world was one of Aristotle’s
chief criticisms of Plato in the first book of the Metaphysics. The contemporary
locus classicus for the epistemic problem with mathematical platonism is Paul
Benacerraf, “Mathematical Truth,” Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973): 661–79. See

46

Faith and Philosophy

also Colin Cheyne, “Existence Claims and Causality,” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 76 (1998): 34–47.
10. Saul A. Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 91–93.
11. Is There a God? (Oxford, Oxford University Press; 1996), pp. 87–88.
12. Steven Stich calls into question the very existence of “rationality” as a
cognitive faculty aimed at discovering the truth (The Fragmentation of Reason
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), chap. 3). Alvin Plantinga defends the reliability of our reasoning, but argues that it is unlikely that evolution alone
would produce reliable cognitive faculties (Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), chap. 12). Thus he holds that the theist
is in a better position than the naturalist with regard to trusting his cognitive
faculties.
13. Roger Penrose, The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 114.
14. Michael Rea, World Without Design (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), pp.
193–95.
15. Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford, Oxford University Press; 1997),
pp. 132–33.
16. George Bealer, “Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy” in Rethinking Intuition, ed. Michael DePaul and William Ramsey (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp.201–40, see p.208.
17. Joel Pust, “On Explaining Knowledge of Necessity,” Dialectica 58 (2004):
71–87. Jerrold Katz, if I am understanding him correctly, advances this thesis
in Realistic Rationalism (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
18. Pust (2004) pp. 78–79.
19. Ibid., p. 74. See David Lewis On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1986), p. 111.
20. Pust (2004), p. 80.
21. For other suggestions regarding the relationship of God to necessary
truth see: C. Menzel, “Theism, Platonism and the Metaphysics of Mathematics,” Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987): 365–82; C. Menzel and T. Morris, “Absolute
Creation,” American Philosophical Quarterly 23 (1986): 353–62; also Plantinga’s
Presidential Address, “How to be an Anti-Realist” in the Proceedings and Addresses of the APA, 1982.
22. Katherin A. Rogers Perfect Being Theology (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2000), pp. 94–96. Brian Leftow discusses a more moderate
analysis of God’s causing necessary truth in “A Leibnizian Cosmological Argument,” Philosophical Studies 57 (1989): 135–55.
23. The question of whether or not humans have libertarian freedom, and
how God knows human choices is a diﬃcult one which would take us far, far
afield.
24. Robert Adams, “Divine Necessity,” Journal of Philosophy 80 (1983): 741–
51, see p. 751.
25. There does seem to be some sort of connection between the physical
world and the world of platonic abstracta. The physical world does behave
in a mathematically describable way. Plato invoked the mysterious relationship of “participation,” but a more plausible proposal might find “the hand of
God” in this connection between the physical world and mathematical truth.
26. I would like to thank William Hasker and anonymous readers for this
journal for lengthy and constructive criticism on earlier versions of this paper,
and my colleague Joel Pust for his more than generous help over several years
of revisions.

